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Somalia versus Captain ‘Hook’: assessing the EU’s security
actorness in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa
Dr Christian Kaunert
University of Dundee, UK and European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Dr Kamil Zwolski
University of Southampton
Abstract An internal security problem of Somalia—state failure from internal conflict
resulting in increased piracy—has increasingly become an external security problem for
the European Union (EU). This article contributes to analysing the role of the EU as
a security actor in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, by examining three different
dimensions of the EU response to this problem: (a) the immediate EU response (the EU
military mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta); (b) the medium-term EU response (the Critical
Maritime Routes (CMR) programme launched by the European Commission); and (c) the
long-term EU response (development and security assistance). This article concludes that
the EU has been very active in addressing piracy through its naval task-force to protect
maritime transport in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, as well as its efforts
to enhance regional counter-piracy capacities and thematic and geographical financial
instruments. The EU thus has taken up the fight against ‘Captain Hook’.
Introduction
You can’t ignore the pirates anymore. They’re gaining more and more muscle. They
used to invest their money in just boats and going out to sea, but now they’re
building up their military side. (Mohamed Aden, a clan leader in central Somalia,
quoted in Gettleman 2010)
Maritime pirates have often been romanticized in popular culture. Steven
Spielberg’s Hook, based on an early twentieth-century play by J.M. Barrie, features
Peter Pan and his main antagonist, pirate Captain Hook, who is the widely feared
lord of the pirate village in Neverland. He wears a big iron hook where his right
hand would have been. Unfortunately, it was cut off by Peter Pan, and
subsequently eaten by a saltwater crocodile. Portrayed as a dangerous character,
Hook is also frustrated and tragic, at some point even contemplating suicide. In the
end, however, good wins against evil when Peter Pan defeats Hook during the
final battle. In the movie Pirates of the Caribbean, pirate Captain Jack Sparrow is a
romantic and intelligent pirate, who prefers to achieve his goals using wit and
intellect, rather than resorting to violence. In contrast, the seventeenth-century
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book The Buccaneers of America, by the French writer Alexandre Exquemelin, offers
an eyewitness story filled with violence, torture and murder. While entertaining,
the piratical fictional characters played by Dustin Hoffman and Johnny Depp,
respectively, do not represent an accurate image of modern-day maritime pirates.
Instead of wearing colourful clothes and travelling on three-mast vessels, the
modern organized crime groups use skiffs and can be more accurately portrayed
as ‘carrying rocket launchers, demanding multimillion dollar ransoms and
hijacking 1,080-foot oil tankers’ (msnbc.com 2008). In recent years, the Horn of
Africa has witnessed an outburst of violence at sea, with most piratical attacks and
almost all cases of hijacking occurring in this region.
A distinctive characteristic of Somali pirates is that they do not merely steal
commercial vessels or their cargo. Instead, they exploit the lack of law
enforcement in their home country by kidnapping crewmembers in exchange
for ransom—a strategy that is much more profitable (Blanchard et al 2009). On
average, one pirate can earn between US$6000 and US$10,000 for a US$1 million
ransom (International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast 2008). This
constitutes the equivalent of two to three years’ salary earned from legal activities
(International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast 2008). However,
it must also be noted that those recruited tend to be uneducated. Thus, they only
have a minimal chance of finding a legitimate source of income at this level.
Although US$10,000 constitutes a substantial gain for a Somali pirate, it is
only a fraction of a typical ransom. Where does the rest of money go? In order to
secure their activities on land, pirates need the support of local political forces—
the warlords. Therefore, a large proportion of the money often goes to those
individuals, who have their own illegal ventures, such as human-trafficking and
mining (Murphy 2009). Significant resources are also ‘reinvested’. Fathi Osman
Kahir, a piracy ‘treasurer’ from an offshore town Hobyo, explains:
When we get more money, we recruit more . . . There’s up to 500 people working
with us in Hobyo, that’s 10 percent of the population and I’m just talking about the
people on the ground . . . We have a hierarchy. What do you think we do? We pay
wages too. (Quoted in Agence France-Presse 2010)
According to Lehr and Lehmann,
The magnitude of Somalia’s pirate problem now seems to be comparable with
that in South-East Asian waters: in both regions, we are basically confronted by
a flourishing organized crime or a veritable ‘piracy industry‘, as compared with
mere ‘maritime mugging‘ elsewhere. (Lehr and Lehmann 2007, 3)
Whilst this observation was accurate before 2008, in recent years Somali piracy
has become an even more serious problem than piracy in Southeast Asia. The
outburst of piracy off the coast of Somalia must be seen as one of many forms of
organized violence linked to the fact that Somalia remains a thoroughly failed
state. The country is torn by violence on a daily basis. It has no central government
possessing control over the territory of the country, or even Somalia’s capital,
Mogadishu. This condition of permanent insecurity contributes to Somalia’s
disastrous humanitarian situation. Currently, the main source of instability in
Somalia is the ongoing struggle of Islamist insurgent groups—some of which are
linked to al-Qaeda—to capture Mogadishu and to take over the rest of the country.
Al-Shabaab is the most prominent among those groups, claiming responsibility
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for the July 2010 bomb attacks in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, in which at least
76 people were killed. Consequently, what used to be an internal security problem
has, in recent years, moved outside Somalia’s international boundaries, and, thus,
has become an international security problem.
In response to this, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) urged states
and regional organizations to take action. Amongst the actors responding to this
request is the European Union (EU), launching its first-ever naval mission
EUNAVFOR Atalanta, a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission.
This article contributes to discussions on the EU as a security actor in the external
dimension of internal security (of Somalia), by analysing different dimensions of
the EU’s response to this problem. The EU has become an international policeman
through its naval capabilities when military forces turn into internal security
missions and adopt certain policing and judicial functions. The argument here is
developed as follows. The first section outlines a comprehensive approach to
analysing the EU as an international security actor, in order to create a framework
for assessing its role in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia. The framework
provides the foundation for three types of EU policy: (a) a military operation
deployed to protect maritime transit as short-term measure, (b) efforts enhancing
anti-piracy capacities in the region as a medium-term response, and (c) the long-
term involvement of the EU in addressing some of the major root causes of
violence and organized crime in Somalia and off its coast.
The EU as a comprehensive security actor in countering maritime piracy
Scholars have long been trying to conceptualize the role of the European
Community, and later the EU, as an actor in international relations (Cosgrove and
Twitchett 1970; Sjo¨tstedt 1977; Hill 1993; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Ginsberg 1999;
Bretherton and Vogler 2006). One way to better understand the EU’s ‘actorness’
has been to compare it to the idea of Europe’s presence in world affairs. The
concept of presence with respect to Western Europe was developed and later
revised by Allen and Smith (1990; 1998), in order to reflect the fact that Western
Europe is neither a fully fledged state-like actor nor a purely dependent
phenomenon. Focusing specifically on the EU, Bretherton and Vogler (2006) define
presence as shaping the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others. Most
importantly, presence does not indicate purposive external action; instead, it is
a consequence of being. By contrast, as Larsen notes, ‘[t]o be an actor in a particular
area must be the same as having a policy in this field’ (Larsen 2003, 12). This article
analyses the policies that the EU has deployed to counter piracy off the coast of
Somalia and considers how these seek to address the root causes of this and other
insecurities in the region.
It is suggested that scholars need to look beyond the immediate actorness of the
Council of the European Union within its Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) institutional framework
in order to be able to assess the EU’s security actorness comprehensively (Zwolski
2012a; 2012b). The EU’s strategic discourse supports this broadening. Notably, the
European Security Strategy (ESS) provides for a holistic understanding of security
(European Council 2003). It identifies more traditional security threats such as
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but also points to global warming and poverty
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as the possible causes of conflict (Biscop 2008, 8–13). This holistic approach is
reinforced in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS in 2008 (European Council
2008). In this document, energy security and climate change are identified as global
challenges and key threats, alongside the proliferation of WMDs, organized crime
and terrorism (European Council 2008, 3–6).
These and other empirical developments have not gone unnoticed in the
scholarly debate on the EU as an international security actor. In fact, there is
a growing body of scholarship that incorporates this broadened approach.
Notably, Kirchner argues that states have lost their monopoly on providing
security and have emerged as one type of participant in a cooperative system
(Kirchner 2006, 962–963). In this cooperative system, according to Marsh and
Mackenstein, the European Community emerged as an international security
actor by contributing to the Western European zone of peace and by establishing a
dense network of economic and humanitarian agreements with the rest of the
world (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005, 15). Indeed, Sebesta points out that the EU
may be well equipped to become a truly revolutionary security actor, considering
its ‘economic might, its political stability, and rich tradition in ideas linking
peace to justice’ (Sebesta 2009, 590).
The comprehensive approach to analysing the EU’s role in international
security is also consistent with developments in security studies more broadly. It
reflects the widening (new security threats) and deepening (new referent objects
of security) of the international security agenda (Williams 2008, 7–9). Problems
previously overshadowed by a nuclear rivalry between major powers and
labelled as ‘low politics’ have become recognized for their impact on the security
of millions beyond the Western world (Annan 2005, 65). This process has been
facilitated by the shift away from an exclusive focus on ‘present’ existential threats
towards a more probabilistic approach, focusing on diffuse risks (McInnes 2008,
276). Thus, security studies experts are not dismissing more traditional security
threats; rather they are also incorporating the analysis of the nexus between
security and health (Elbe 2007; McInnes 2008), security and poverty (Thomas
2008) and security and climate change (Barnett 2003; De Wilde 2008; Dalby 2009;
Zwolski and Kaunert 2011).
Based on the strategic discourse within the EU, as well as the growing body of
literature on the EU as a security actor adopting a comprehensive approach—
which has been further reinforced by developments in security studies—
this article suggests a comprehensive approach to analysing the EU as a security
actor against maritime piracy. In this argument, the framework suggested by
Hintermeier (2008) will be adopted. He notes that the EU’s approach to security is
based on two liberal institutionalist principles: (a) political integration, economic
interdependence and multilateral cooperation, which together weaken the
anarchical system of states, and (b) the principle of democratic peace (Hintermeier
2008, 667). More specifically, the EU pursues its security objectives through
integration and enlargement, promotion of liberal values, promotion of
sustainable development, effective multilateralism and strengthening inter-
national law. According to this view, the EU pursues these objectives through
a combination of three types of instruments: (a) military; (b) political (for example,
civilian crisis management instruments); and (c) economic (for example, positive
and negative incentives, development aid).
596 Christian Kaunert and Kamil Zwolski
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 D
un
de
e] 
at 
08
:10
 01
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
These policy instruments, reflecting the comprehensive approach to studying
the role of the EU as a security actor, correspond to three categories of
recommendations on how to best address the problem of Somali maritime piracy.
These recommendations fall into the following categories: (a) protecting maritime
transit; (b) enhancing regional capacity; and (c) addressing root causes (Figure 1).
With regard to measures aimed at protecting maritime transit (military
instruments), the most radical recommendations include ashore operations
against Somali leaders, bases and supporting structures. Vego suggests that
a ‘major counter-piracy operation should be planned, prepared, and conducted by
a joint/combined task force commander’ (Vego 2009, 176–177). Similarly,
Commander Nakamura (Nakamura 2009) argues that pirate bases have to be
attacked directly by special-operations forces and these attacks must be followed
by conventional-forces operations on land. Less radical, but still within the
category of military policies, are recommendations calling for ‘more of the same’,
which entails the expansion of counter-piracy military operations in the region in
order to cover areas further away from the Somali coast (Sterio 2010).
With regard to measures designed to enhance regional capacity, experts point
to enhancing coastal monitoring and interdiction capabilities through training,
technical support and deploying appropriate surveillance assets (Chalk 2008). For
example, in Southeast Asia, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) created an Information Sharing Centre,
aiming to enhance the capacities of states in the region to tackle piracy of their
coasts (Ho 2009). A similar instrument is currently being developed for countries
around the Gulf of Aden, under the auspices of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). Also, the shipping industry must continuously work to
improve the capacities of merchant vessels to defend themselves. To this end,
Protecting
maritime transit
Enhancing regional
capacity
Addressing root
causes
Military capacities
Civilian crisis
management
Economic
assistance
EU security
policy
instruments
Instruments for
countering
piracy
Short term
Medium term
Long term
Atalanta
Promoting BMP
CMR
programme
Humanitarian aid
Development aid
Security aid
Figure 1. The EU as an international security actor in the case of maritime piracy: three
categories of instruments
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EUNAVFOR Atalanta has been publicizing the ‘Best Management Practices to
Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area’ (BMP). The
BMP is a set of rules developed by the shipping industry in cooperation with EU
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) task forces operating in the Gulf
of Aden, to raise awareness among ship crews about how to avoid piratical attacks
and what to do should an attack occur.
With regard to economic and financial measures, experts almost unanimously
point to addressing the problem of the failed state of Somalia. For example, Vego
observes that the causes of Somali piracy are political, economic and social; thus
the response must be comprehensive, addressing these very issues (Vego 2009,
178). In this context, participants in the workshop sponsored by Research ANd
Development (RAND) on combating modern piracy underlined the importance of
offering Somali coastal communities alternative sources of income, such as the
development of small-scale industry and cooperative businesses (Chalk et al
2009). Regardless of the specific measures, at the core of the recommended
preventive solutions is the message that ‘[i]f the states had invested the time and
resources they now devote to combating piracy in reconstructing the Somali
society and economy, they would probably not now have to cope with these
problems’ (Archibugi and Chiarugi 2009). Figure 1 illustrates how the
comprehensive approach to analysing the EU’s role in international security,
suggested by Hintermeier (2008), corresponds with specific recommendations for
tackling Somali piracy.
All these measures, ranging from short-term military missions to long-term
developmental efforts, reflect the complexity of the challenge at hand. Somali
piracy, as one of the many outcomes of the failed state of Somalia, underscores
problems such as the lack of law enforcement, extreme poverty and the lack of
effective political governance. Scholars have recognized the complexity of
maritime piracy in the Horn of Africa, and have tried to identify the main causes
of piracy in this region. According to Murphy (2009), the following enabling
factors are particularly relevant for understanding the outburst of piracy in the
Horn of Africa:
a. First, conflict and disorder create enabling conditions for piracy to thrive.
This is at the root of piracy in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden,
conflict and disorder having ravaged Somalia for almost two decades.
b. Second, the promise of receiving significant financial rewards, underpinned
by extreme poverty, is also a crucial factor. Yet, Burnett notes that ‘[p]overty is
the driving force behind the increase in piracy, not just off the coast of Africa,
but in the Caribbean, South America, India, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia’
(Burnett 2002, 117).
c. Third, underfunded law enforcement and inadequate security characterize the
Horn of Africa more generally, not only Somalia. Other states in the region,
notably Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania and Yemen, do not either, as yet, have
capacities to tackle piracy effectively.
Furthermore, maritime piracy expert Peter Chalk (2008) suggests that the massive
increase in commercial maritime traffic and the global proliferation of small arms
are additional significant factors enabling piracy. According to him, ready access
to munitions such as pistols, light and heavy machine guns, and rocket-propelled
grenades (RPG), among others, ‘is one of the main factors contributing to the
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growing level of violence that has come to typify piracy in recent years’ (Chalk
2008, 14). Other reasons for piracy, according to Chalk, include: the use by
maritime traffic of narrow and congested maritime chokepoints; the Asian
financial crisis; external pressure after the September 11 attacks on states to invest
in expensive homeland security systems, which had a negative impact on
securing territorial waters; the low level of security in ports, leading to harbour
thefts (particularly in the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia); and, finally, corrupt
and dysfunctional national criminal justice systems.
The complex and multifaceted causes of Somali piracy necessitate a
comprehensive, three-pronged response, as outlined above. The EU participates
in all three types of recommended responses to piracy, which include: (a)
protecting maritime transit, (b) enhancing regional capacity and (c) addressing
root causes. Table 1 summarizes the policies and instruments that the EU has
deployed up to date. They include measures that directly aim to counter the
problem piracy, but also those with broader objectives of improving economic and
security conditions in the failed state of Somalia. The next section will analyse
each of the three responses to piracy undertaken by the EU.
Counter-piracy efforts: analysing the empirical instruments
In this section, this article will analyse the three types of EU policy that aim to
address the problem of Somali piracy—directly (over the short and medium term)
and indirectly (over the long term). The section first outlines the scope of the first-
ever EU naval mission, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which aims to provide protection
for maritime transit by directly engaging suspected pirates. The mission was
launched in December 2008, and its mandate was extended until December 2012.
Subsequently, this section analyses the EU’s efforts aiming to enhance regional
capacities, which can be considered a medium-term response. Finally, this section
also examines long-term EU policy on Somalia, which aims to address some of the
root causes of piracy and other security problems in this country, such as the lack
of effective law enforcement.1
Protecting maritime transit
EUNAVFOR Atalanta is the flagship EU response to the problem of piracy off the
coast of Somalia.2 It is also the first EU naval mission. It was launched by the EU
1 The EU’s competence to develop these policies rests in the provisions of the treaties.
EUNAVFOR Atalanta is grounded in the provisions of Treaty of the European Union, in
particular Article 14, the third subparagraph of Article 25 and Article 28(3). Regional
capacities are mainly enhanced through the Instrument for Stability, and particularly
the Critical Maritime Routes Programme. The Instrument for Stability, as well as
development financial assistance, is legally grounded in the provisions of the treaty
establishing the European Community.
2 It must be noted that other international actors are also active in the region. In October
2008, NATO deployed its Operation Allied Provider in the Horn of Africa to protect World
Food Programme and other vulnerable vessels in the region. Allied Provider terminated in
December 2008, but in 2009 NATO deployed another mission: Allied Protector. After its
mandate expired in August 2009, a new mission followed: Operation Ocean Shield, which
has a mandate until the end of 2012. Although both the EU and NATO make an effort to
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Council of Ministers in November 2008. The Council Joint Action from 10
November 2008 provides the legal basis for this CSDP operation, stating that ‘[t]he
European Union (EU) shall conduct a military operation in support of Resolutions
1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008)’ (Council of the European Union 2008, 35).
The purpose of this unprecedented EU operation was defined as twofold: to
protect the vessels of the World Food Program delivering aid to Somalia and to
protect vulnerable vessels cruising off the coast of Somalia.
EUNAVFOR Atalanta consists of two major components. The first component
includes warships, surveillance planes and other military capabilities of EU
member states, commanded by the Operational Commander in Northwood and
the Force Commander in Djibouti. The second component includes a web-based
platform called the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa).3 This platform,
established by the EU in cooperation with the shipping industry, contributes to the
security of maritime transport in the Gulf of Aden through the constant
monitoring of registered vessels. In addition, it also allows actors involved in
fighting piracy off the Somali coast to coordinate their efforts in real time.
The total number of EU military units involved in EUNAVFOR Atalanta has
changed over the course of the operation. Table 2 indicates some of the capabilities
deployed by EU member states.4
The EU also offers vulnerable vessels, upon their request, the protection of the
so-called ‘independent vessels protection detachments’. In June 2009, six such
vessels were available in the region. The EU budget for the operation within the
first year (December 2008 to December 2009) was established as e8.3 million. This
sum covered expenses related to the functioning of the Operational Headquarters
(OHQ) in Northwood and the Force Headquarters (FHQ) in Djibouti. It was
collected from EU member states, proportionally to their gross domestic product
(GDP). The actual costs of deployments are covered by individual member states
taking part in the operation.5
Table 1. The EU short-to-long-term resources
Protecting maritime transit † EUNAVFOR Atalanta military operation
† Web-based platform Maritime Security Centre: Horn
of Africa
Enhancing regional capacities † CMR programme
† BMP
Addressing root causes † Humanitarian assistance
† Development assistance
† Security-oriented assistance
† EUTM training mission in Uganda
Footnote 2 continued
underline close cooperation between their deployments, some criticism has been raised that
two separate missions duplicate already expensive resources and are ‘no more than a
maritime beauty contest’ (Seibert 2009). The US has been channelling its capabilities either
through NATO or through the multinational Combined Task Force (CTF) 151. Other states
active in the region include China, Russia, Japan, India, Iran and Malaysia.
3,www.mschoa.org ..
4,www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/naviresOCTOBRE.pdf..
5,www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/
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The military capabilities provided by EU member states constitute just one,
albeit the most visible, dimension of EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Another important
resource allowing the EU to develop its actorness in the area of organized crime
off the coast of Somalia is a web-based platform called ‘Maritime Security Centre:
Horn of Africa’ (MSCHOA). An EU Military Staff official explained that the
rationale for creating this website was to convince ship-owners and insurers that
the Gulf of Aden was safe for transport. Otherwise, he pointed out, maritime
transit in this region would become too expensive.6 He also admitted that
MSCHOA is ‘unprecedented for any military operation in history’.7 The website
has three sections:
a. An unprotected section, providing general information about EUNAVFOR
Atalanta, including yachting guidelines.
b. A password-protected section, explaining how those cruising through the Gulf
of Aden can protect themselves, that is, what to do if an attack occurs. To this
end, the website offers ship-owners ‘the facility to register their details
securely with MSCHOA, update positions of their vessels and receive
information and guidance designed to reduce the risk of pirate attacks’.8 In
2009, there were over 4500 registered users.
c. An additional-security section, allowing live communication among states
and organizations involved in fighting piracy in the region of the western
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Some of the international actors that have
been using the chat room include: EUNAVFOR OHQ and FHQ, Combined
Task Force (CTF) 151, China, NATO, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Malaysia and
the Seychelles. An official from the EU Military Staff admitted that ‘it is
remarkable that our partners really use it’.9
The popularity of this platform is indeed an indication of the EU’s recognition as
a facilitator of the exchange of information among actors fighting piracy off the coast
of Somalia. Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) for the Combined Maritime Forces,
Commander Alistair Clark, envisaged in June 2009 that MERCURY (the technical
name of the chat room) was about to become ‘the main means of disseminating
unclassified information’ (Clark 2009, 7). Both aspects of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the
Table 2. EUNAVFOR Atalanta military capabilities
Surveillance
airplanes
Number: 3 P3-A (Spanish), P3-C (German), Atlantique 2 (French)
Naval ships Number: 11 Canarias (Spanish), Bremen and Karlsruhe (German), La
Fayette, Ame´thyste, Germinal and Floreal (French), Evertsen
(Dutch), HS Adrias (Greek), Louise Marie (Belgian), Fridtjof
Nansen (Norwegian)
Footnote 5 continued
091207%20Factsheet%20EU%20NAVFOR%20Somalia%20-%20version%2013_EN02.
pdf ..
6 So far, most shipping companies have continued to calculate the odds in terms of
transiting the Gulf of Aden, reasoning that the cost of diverting to alternative routes far
exceeds the risk of attack.
7 Interview in the EU Military Staff, 9 June 2009.
8,www.mschoa.eu/About.aspx ..
9 Ibid.
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military and electronic, constitute an important step for the EU to develop a military
dimension of its international security actorness in the area of organized crime.
The military operation adds a naval component to the EU experience of
working within the framework of the CSDP. Rear Admiral Philip Jones of the UK
Ministry of Defence, when examined by the House of Lords, underlined the
novelty of Atalanta:
It is the first ever EU maritime operation conducted under ESDP. I am the first ever
UK commander of an EU operation under ESDP, so there are two very significant
firsts there, and I think that the range of other navies that we are dealing with in the
area has been an absolute first. (House of Lords 2010, 1)
The MSCHOA, on the other hand, demonstrates how internet technologies can
be utilized when responding to contemporary security challenges, such as
organized crime. Admiral Jones notes that the website ‘has been one of the
unexpected and very significant successes of the operation, where almost all of the
shipping companies that transit through the Gulf of Aden register’ (House of
Lords 2010, 3).
Enhancing the regional capacity
In order to investigate the EU as a counter-piracy security actor in a
comprehensive manner, analysis must go beyond the military operation and
also include longer-term activities. This implies and demands moving beyond the
CSDP, in order to look at all the instruments available to the EU, most notably
through the European Commission (and currently the European External Action
Service (EEAS)). While the Commission, traditionally, has not been regarded as
important for EU security, over time this view has begun to be questioned
(Kirchner 2006; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Kaunert 2005; 2007; 2010a;
2010b; 2010c; Kaunert and Della Giovanna 2010; Kaunert and Le´onard 2011). In
fact, empirically, it has been playing an increasingly significant role in EU security
policy, both within and outside EU borders.
To perform such a role, the Commission has had a number of financial
instruments at its disposal, the most important of which is the Instrument for
Stability (IfS) (Ga¨nzle 2009; see also Zwolski 2011a; 2011b). Following the Lisbon
Treaty reforms, the IfS will now be partially developed by the EEAS and
implemented by the European Commission. This instrument, according to former
member of the European Parliament (MEP) Angelika Beer, constitutes the first
attempt to:
define the Grey Zone between the Council’s CFSP, ESDP and the Commission’s
development policy, a step that might complete existing programs and might
encourage active conflict prevention. (Beer 2006)
The IfS is designed for the EU to participate in projects aimed at strengthening
law enforcement, as well as strengthening the capacities of judicial and civil
authorities in such areas as combating terrorism and organized crime (European
Parliament and the Council 2006).
One of the areas where the EU can get involved, through the IfS, is in combating
‘threats to international transport, energy operations and critical infrastructure,
including passenger and freight traffic and energy distribution’ (European
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Parliament and the Council 2006). This competence enables the EU to utilize the IfS,
which in principle is a non-CFSP instrument, to address the security problem of
maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. The Critical Maritime Routes (CMR)
programme has been developed for this purpose, aiming to finance transnational
initiatives enhancing the security of maritime transit, such as the sharing of
information among states in vulnerable regions. The European Commission, in its
IfS Multi-Annual Indicative Program 2009–2011, defined the CMR as follows:
This program will seek to address a number of risks and threats posed by piracy
and armed robbery at sea in a comprehensive and integrated way by bringing
together the appropriate legal frameworks, institutional arrangements and
operational measures, including capacity building to improve the exchange of
information. (European Commission 2009a)
Although the main geographical focus of the CMR programme is the Horn of
Africa, limited support is also envisaged for combating piracy in Southeast Asia.
Thus, in order to learn more about desirable responses to piracy in Southeast Asia,
the Commission arranged a series of high-level expert missions to Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia. The purpose of these missions was ‘to identify, select and
recruit experts from EU member states who would help us to prepare the specific
projects in the regions’.10 In spring 2008, as a result of the sharp increase of piracy
in the western Indian Ocean, the Commission decided that it was also necessary to
deploy a similar fact-finding mission to countries around Somalia. A set of visits
were organized to Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Somalia was not included,
at the time, due to its lack of institutional capacities to actively engage in the fight
against piracy.
Commission-sponsored projects are developed multilaterally under the
auspices of the IMO. Of notable importance, in this regard, was the IMO meeting
in Djibouti, in January 2009, in which the Commission participated as an observer.
One major outcome of this meeting was the so-called Code of Conduct (Code of
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden), together with the Resolution
on Enhancing Training in the Region (IMO 2009). One of the priorities identified in
the Code of Conduct was to enhance the sharing of information among the states
in the region. To this end, the establishment of ‘information exchange centres’ was
envisaged in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen (IMO 2009). The European Commission
decided to contribute to setting up the centre in Yemen. The centres do not seem to
have become operational at the time of writing.
An official from DG EuropeAid Co-operation Office of the European
Commission explained that, at the very minimum, the information-sharing centres
in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden should mirror those already in place in
Southeast Asia, established by the ReCAAP (Ho 2009). The Resolution on Enhancing
Training in the Region, another important outcome of the Djibouti meeting in 2009,
requests the Secretary-General of the IMO to establish a training centre in Djibouti,
which will allow a uniform implementation of the Code of Conduct. The European
Commission subsequently decided to support this project financially. For the
10 Interview at the European Commission, 10 June 2009.
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period 2009–2011 the Commission assigned between e14 and e18 million for the
implementation of the CMR programme (European Commission 2009a).
Addressing the root causes
Given our focus here on the EU as an actor in the external dimension of internal
security (of Somalia), most notably piracy and organized crime, this article needs
also to include longer-term EU activities. From talking to EU officials, it appears
that addressing the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia is very important
for the EU. In this context, some observers point to illegal fishing and toxic waste
dumping as important reasons for piracy to emerge (Hari 2009; Tharoor 2009).
These factors were also identified as root causes of piracy by a Somali government
official during a May 2010 informal United Nations (UN) General Assembly
meeting on piracy (UN 2010).
However, regardless of the degree to which illegal fishing and toxic waste
dumping contributed to piracy off the Somali coast, almost all experts and EU
officials agree that the failed state of Somalia constitutes the main root cause of
piracy in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Extreme poverty, the
lack of law enforcement, and corrupt officials (warlords) make any anti-piracy
task force only a partial solution. In order to address the problem over the long
term, structural conditions in Somalia need to improve. Yet, this is easier said than
done; indeed this task seems next to impossible in the post-2006 climate of
constant violence and humanitarian disaster. Nonetheless, the EU remains the
largest donor of official development assistance to Somalia, committed to
improving political, economic and security conditions in this country. With regard
to the political situation in Somalia, the EU, together with other international
actors, continues to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as the
only authority in Somalia considered legitimate by the international community.
In order to enhance security in Somalia, the EU contributes financially to the
peacekeeping mission of the African Union (AU), and to the Rule of Law Program
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and recently it also
started its own training programme in Uganda for Somali security forces.
European Union development aid to Somalia is guided by the framework
prepared jointly by the UN Development Group and the World Bank, upon the
request of the TFG. Their work on the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) for Somalia
began in 2005, and resulted in the five-volume document called the ‘Reconstruc-
tion and Development Program for Somalia’ (RDP). The RDP identifies a number
of priority needs for Somalia, which were grouped into three broad pillars:
(a) deepening peace, improving security and establishing good governance;
(b) investing in people through improved social services; and (c) creating enabling
environment for private-sector-led growth to expand employment and reduce
poverty (UN and World Bank 2008). The EU incorporated these pillars into its own
development strategy for Somalia for the years 2008–2013 (EU 2008). Overall,
the EU’s long-term engagement in Somalia can be grouped into five categories:
(a) EU humanitarian aid, (b) EU development aid, (c) EU support for the Rule of
Law programme, derived from the UNDP, (d) EU support for AMISOM, the AU
peacekeeping mission in Somalia, and (e) EU training missions in Uganda.
European Union humanitarian aid to Somalia is managed by the Humanitarian
Aid department of the European Commission (ECHO). In Somalia, conditions for
604 Christian Kaunert and Kamil Zwolski
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 D
un
de
e] 
at 
08
:10
 01
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
delivering humanitarian aid are extremely difficult, with 37 aid workers killed in
2008; this was 66 per cent of all aid workers killed worldwide (Sullivan 2009). At the
same time, Somalia is in a state of a constant humanitarian disaster, 225 out of
1000 children not reaching the age of five (EU 2008). The European Commission
increased its humanitarian assistance from e12 million in 2007 to e45.8 million in
2008 (Council of the European Union 2010a). In 2010, the Commission allocated
e35 million for the victims of conflict and natural disasters in Somalia (European
Commission 2010a), but also e15 million for Somalis in Kenya, the location of
the world’s biggest refugee camp (European Commission 2010b).
European Union development aid, as opposed to humanitarian assistance,
contributes to long-term development projects aimed at changing the structural
conditions in the country. It is constructed around three main focal sectors,
reflecting the three pillars identified in the RDP. The focal sectors, identified in
EU’s Somalia Joint Strategy Paper for the Period 2008–2013 (European Union
2008), include:
a. Governance: promoting security, supporting reconciliation, strengthening
governance, supporting Somali non-state actors.
b. Education: strengthening and expanding the capacity of administration at
all levels, the teaching force, access to education, the participation of
disadvantaged adults.
c. Economic development and food security: developing the framework for
private-sector-led growth, supporting the main productive sectors, supporting
sustainable management of natural resources, supporting food security and
livelihood recovery.
The total budget for the long-term EU’s development assistance to Somalia for the
years 2008–2013 is e215 million.
However, the EU is also involved in providing more security-focused
assistance. First, the EU contributes to the Rule of Law and Security Program of
the UNDP. This initiative aims to improve the security situation in Somalia
through projects such as:
a. Judiciary/access to justice: building mobile courts, training professionals,
establishing the Women Lawyers’ Association in Somalia.
b. Law enforcement: providing training for the police, increasing access for
women and children to justice.
c. Community safety: building on the experience of similar projects in Haiti,
Colombia and El Salvador, this project supports local communities in
organizing local safety committees and in developing community safety plans.
The EU has been focusing on supporting the development of the police force in
Somalia, committing in total e43 million over the last few years (Council of the
European Union 2010a).
In addition, the EU supports AMISOM, the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia,
launched by the AU Peace and Security Council in January 2007 and authorized
by the UN Security Council (UNSC 2007). This mission, supported by the EU,
the United States (US) and other international donors right from the beginning,
aims to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces after they
removed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from power in December 2006.
Considering that many defeated Islamist fighters were involved in initiating the
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guerrilla war in Somalia, the AU ministers decided that the existence of the TFG
could only be secured by an external peacekeeping mission. AMISOM, although
critical for the security of the Somali government, has limited resources. At the
same time, al-Shabaab has increased its pressure, trying to capture, for example,
the Presidential Palace in May 2010. African Union ministers, as a result of
Kampala attacks in July 2010, attempted to broaden the mandate of the mission, to
include peace enforcement, but this move was blocked by the UN (Kasasira and
Muyita 2010). Since 2007, the EU has committed over e100 million to the support
of AMISOM. Most notably, the EU pledged e60 million at the International Donor
Conference on Somalia, hosted by the European Commission in April 2009, and
co-organized by the UN and the AU (European Commission 2009b).
Moreover, in addition to supporting security in Somalia through other
international frameworks, the EU launched its own mission in April 2010, aiming
to train 2000 Somali forces in Uganda. EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia
intends to contribute to the security situation in Somalia as part of a wider
international effort and encompassing inter alia the vetting of trainees, the
monitoring and mentoring of the forces once back in Mogadishu and the funding
and payment of the salaries of the soldiers (Council of the European Union 2010b)
The success of this mission, which has the potential to significantly enhance the
quality of the Somali army, will depend on the stability of wages being paid to those
who are being trained. In April 2010, media outlets revealed that many Somali
soldiers, trained with the support of US funding in Djibouti, deserted (Associated
Press and Smith 2010). While some of them returned to their families, others joined
al-Shabaab and are now involved in fighting the TFG and AMISOM forces.
Ultimately, the only long-term solution to piracy off the coast of Somalia is
a more stable and lawful state of Somalia. This section demonstrated that the EU
remains very active in providing long-term assistance. Yet, it remains difficult to
assess the effectiveness of the EU’s involvement. This is due to the fact that
Somalia remains a thoroughly failed state, torn by permanent fights between
various clans, as well as between Islamist insurgents and the forces supporting the
TFG. As a result, it remains almost impossible to assess any progress. As a vivid
example, one can note the fact that Somalia has been unable to even deliver data
for the UNDP in order to rank the country in the Human Development Index.
Over the long term, security and development in Somalia will depend on the
ability of the parties to the conflict to reach some sort of agreement, as happened in
2004, when the Transitional Federal Institutions were created. Until then, the EU,
through a variety of instruments at its disposal, needs to remain a leading
international actor facilitating progress towards this goal.
Conclusion
In recent years, the internal security problem of Somalia has become an external
security problem for the entire international community, the UNSC urging its
member states and regional organizations to combat piracy. This article
demonstrated how the EU has managed to construct an important role for itself
in emerging security areas, such as the external dimension of Somalia’s internal
security problem. To this end, the article has analysed three types of EU policy,
aiming to respond to this problem directly and indirectly. These policies include:
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(1) policies aiming to protect maritime transport, primarily EUNAVFOR Atalanta;
(2) policies aiming to enhance regional capacities, such as the CMR programme
and the promotion of the BMP; and (3) efforts to address the root causes of
insecurities in Somalia and off its coast, through a variety of assistance and
training programmes. Figure 2 indicates that, whilst the EU’s efforts to address the
problem of maritime piracy are important and can be considered to some degree
successful, longer-term policies aiming to improve the structural conditions in
Somalia, albeit important, have not yet achieved visible positive outcomes.
The empirical evidence at hand seems to suggest that international anti-piracy
measures deployed in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean have
achieved a degree of success. In the first three-quarters of 2010, the relative
number of attacks worldwide and off the coast of Somalia decreased compared
with 2009. In the Gulf of Aden, 44 attacks were reported as compared with 100 for
the same period in 2009 (ICC-CCS 2010a). The report of the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC) Commercial Crime Services (CCS) points to the role of
international actors: ‘This marked reduction can be attributed to the continued
presence and success of the navies in the Gulf of Aden along with the robust anti
piracy measures adopted by the merchant navy fleet’ (ICC-CCS 2010b). Further,
International Maritime Bureau director Pottengal Mukunda points to the BMP as
another important factor that helped to achieve this reduction in the number of
piratical attacks (ICC-CCS 2010a). The fact that piracy in the Gulf of Aden
declined in 2010 indicates a degree of success of the EU and other international
actors.
However, at the same time, Somali pirates have moved further away from
the Somali coast, with attacks reported for example in the Red Sea. Even more
importantly, military protection of maritime transit cannot be considered a long-
term solution to preventing Somali piracy from occurring. As the Deputy
Operation Commander for EUNAVFOR Atalanta points out, pirates have
Protecting maritime
transit
Enhancing regional
capacity
Addressing root
causes
Military capacities
Civilian crisis
management
Economic
assistance
EU security
policy
instruments
Instruments for
countering piracy
Short term
Medium term
Long term
Atalanta
Promoting BMP
CMR
programme
Humanitarian aid Development aid
Security aid
Figure 2. Longer-term EU policies to improve the structural conditions in Somalia have not
yet achieved visible positive outcomes
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developed their capabilities and operate in a vast area; thus it is crucial to stop
money flowing to pirate gangs and to target pirate leaders. Yet, to achieve these
objectives, the state of Somalia would have to be fully involved in anti-piracy
measures. This, at the moment, is an impossible condition, given the severity
of Somali state failure.
Somalia has often been mentioned as the first failed state; in fact, its overall
security situation is probably worse than anywhere else in the world. More
recently, some authors have even raised questions over the strategy of supporting
the TFG, identifying such a strategy as unsustainable in the long run. For example,
Bruton (2009) advocates the strategic disengagement of the US and the
international community from supporting the Somali government (Bruton 2009,
82). This should be replaced, in her view, with a decentralized approach focused
on providing aid to the society, even at the expense of Islamists securing the
leadership of the country. If this proved to be the only available option in the long
term, given the fact that the country, according to some authors, is ‘beyond repair’,
then clearly the EU’s security-oriented assistance to Somalia would ultimately
emerge as a waste of money, and, in the end, be doomed to fail (Tannock 2009).
However, this article does not provide any evidence to support this notion; in fact,
it is very difficult to support this suggestion with empirical evidence. Rather,
we have demonstrated the increasing role of the EU as an international security
actor with respect to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia.
At present, empirical research is unable to truly assess the effectiveness of any
actor in Somalia. This also constitutes an important limitation upon assessing the
role of the EU as a security actor in the case of Somali piracy, particularly with
regard to the long-term, structural component of this role. Reliable data from
Somalia are scarce. This means that we are unable to empirically assess the
effectiveness of the EU’s policies, but, equally, we are also unable to assess other
international actors, whether the US, the UN or the AU in terms of effectiveness.
As a result, it is necessary to measure alternative dimensions of international
counter-piracy efforts, such as the comprehensiveness of such efforts. In this
regard, one can note that the EU’s efforts are reasonably successful in that they are
sufficiently comprehensive. In the case of Somali piracy, the comprehensive
nature of security policy entails addressing the challenge at different levels,
reflecting the fact that piracy in the Horn of Africa cannot be separated from
problems on Somali land, most notably constant violence and extreme poverty.
The EU has been active in addressing these problems through its thematic and
geographical financial instruments, thus indirectly contributing to addressing
the root causes of piracy. In addition to these long-term efforts, more recently the
EU has become active in enhancing regional counter-piracy capacities and, most
visibly, it has deployed a naval task-force to protect maritime transport in the
western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
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